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Do You See What I See? Reflections
on How Bias Infiltrates the New
York City Family Court - the Case
of the Court Ordered Investigation
LEAH A. HILL*
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who
haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie
ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and
liquids - and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisi-
ble, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the
bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as
though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard distorting glass.
When they approach me they see only my surroundings, them-
selves, or figments of their imagination - indeed, everything and
anything except me.
- Ralph Ellison'
* Associate Clinical Professor, Family Advocacy Clinic, Fordham Law School. I
would like to thank Professor Terry Smith for his encouragement and support. I also
thank Associate Dean Ann Moynihan and Professor Lyn Slater for helping me in the intial
stages of developing the idea for this Article. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude
forthe research and editing assistance provided by Rosemarie Ruddy and the many editors
at the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems.
1. RALPH ELLISON, THE INVISIBLE MAN 3 (Vintage Books 1995) (1952).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty-five years after I first encountered the day-to-
day world inside the New York City Family Court, I can still viv-
idly recall the experience. Like the protagonist in Ralph Ellison's
powerful classic, not only did I feel invisible, I felt that no one
else in the courthouse could see what I was seeing. If they could,
surely they would feel the same need to scream, to call for pro-
tests, to alert the media, to file a class action lawsuit, for this
could not be legal - this could not be justice. It was the summer
of 1983 and I was an intern at the Legal Aid Society's Juvenile
Rights Division (JRD). I was an enthusiastic and eager law stu-
dent, fresh out of my first year of law school.
I spent the first few days of my internship in the office law li-
brary reading through a variety of materials about practice in
Family Court. I read pages and pages of eloquently written stat-
utes and commentary, case law and treatises, filled with refer-
ences to the "rights" of parties in family court proceedings - the
right to due process, the right to legal representation - refer-
ences to protecting family integrity and children's best interests.
I remember being impressed by the themes of rights and values
that weaved their way through the materials. The JRD trial of-
fice complex was housed on several floors within the same build-
ing as the Manhattan Family Court. I worked in an office that
was adjacent to the court waiting areas. I would pass through
the court waiting area each morning on my way into the office,
during lunch, and on my way home. The orange plastic seats
were barely filled during these times. After spending my first
week alone with words and fantasies, it came as a great shock to
witness the courthouse in full swing the first time I spent a full
day in Family Court.
I was assigned to "shadow" a JRD staff attorney as he went
about his daily routine. I followed him- around as he shuffled
from courtroom to courtroom to appear for his many cases. As we
moved through the courthouse I was jolted by the way in which
the previously serene building came to life. The waiting rooms
were filled - standing room only - with mostly black and brown
people, the majority of them women, waiting for their cases to be
called. Lawyers talked with clients in the hallways and on stair-
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cases, court officers yelled the names of litigants into the waiting
room, and many people walked about looking lost.
Once inside the courtrooms, my head snapped back and forth
as I watched the judges and lawyers proceed at break-neck speed.
Off-the-record discussions about litigants during breaks in the
proceedings were common. Judges, lawyers, court officers, and
clerks commented on the litigants and the most intimate details
of cases that had just concluded. Impatience seemed the order of
the day. For judges, lawyers, and courthouse staff, indifference
seemed to be a job requirement. I ached for the litigants who
were often visibly upset and crying as they were ordered out of
the courtroom at the conclusion of their cases. Many of them
seemed dazed and confused as they left, usually with nothing but
a yellow two-by-four slip of paper indicating the next adjourn-
ment date - the only evidence that they had been inside a court-
room. Proceedings involving child abuse, juvenile delinquency,
and termination of parental rights all progressed at the same diz-
zying pace. When I left the Court that day, I could not get the
images out of my head: waiting rooms overcrowded with people of
color that reminded me of segregation; confused and quick pro-
ceedings that didn't match the visions of due process I had con-
jured up in my first year of law school; and judges and court per-
sonnel who were rude, impatient, and insensitive to the litigants.
I remember thinking in my grandiose, youthful innocence, this
has got to change.
It has been over twenty-three years since I first encountered
the New York City Family Court. During this period there have
been countless reports, critiques, and reform efforts instituted by
those inside and outside of the system.2 And yet the Family
2. See, e.g., Hon. Judith Kaye and Hon. Jonathan Lippman, New York State Unified
Court System Family Justice Program, 36 FAM. CT. REV. 144 (1998). The authors, Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals and Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York,
respectively, identify vast problems in the functioning of New York's family courts and set
forth a comprehensive long-term strategic plan for reform which was launched in 1997.
The centerpiece of the plan, "a proposal for a constitutional amendment that will funda-
mentally restructure the trial court system in New York and create a Unified Family
Division," has yet to move forward. Id. at 145. See also SPECIAL CHILD WELFARE
ADVISORY PANEL, ANNE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, ADVISORY REPORT ON FRONT LINE AND
SUPERVISORY PRACTICE 44-52 (2000) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT ON FAMILY COURT];
JULIA VITULLO-MARTIN & BRIAN MAXEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, NEW YORK FAMILY
COURT: COURT USER PERSPECTIVES (2000), available at http'/www.vera.org/
publication.pdf/nyfamilcourt.pdf (reporting results of a survey designed to identify and
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Court continues to be a world of overcrowded waiting rooms and
long waits,3 where most litigants are poor people of color,4 where
most proceedings conclude in ten minutes or less, and where
waiting rooms often double as law offices.5 It is a world where
patience is sometimes in short supply and where litigants are
often invisible in the ways described in Ralph Ellison's opening
passage. Since my first exposure to the world of Family Court in
1983, I have developed a greater understanding about the inner
workings of the court and the nature of the day-to-day work done
there. I have served on committees and task forces devoted to
examining and improving various aspects of the Court. I have
represented hundreds of clients in Family Court proceedings in
four New York City counties - Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx,
and Queens. As a Family Court observer I have witnessed com-
passion and patience in some courtrooms and I have seen due
process at work every now and then. Yet I have not forgotten the
jolt I experienced when I first entered the world that is family
court, and I feel that jolt each time I enter and witness scenes not
unlike those I first encountered over two decades ago. At best,
the Court is an institution that is ill-equipped to deal with the
complexities6 of family life for the hundreds of thousands of liti-
provide feedback to the Court on the problems facing professional and non-professional
court users with the ultimate goal of improving the experience of Family Court); LIBERTY
ALDRICH ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3 (2002) (Announcing a reform agenda that resulted from "a year-long study designed to
take stock of the permanency planning process from top to bottom," the Blueprint "offer[s]
a coordinated plan for improving the processing of abuse and neglect matters in the Fam-
ily Court.").
3. See SPECIAL REPORT ON FAMILY COURT, supra note 2, at 44-45.
4. While there are no reliable data on the demographics of Family Court users, an
informal survey of self-represented Family Court litigants in all five boroughs provides a
powerful depiction: of the 1857 respondents surveyed, 48% identified themselves as Afri-
can-American, 4% Asian, 31% Hispanic, and as or Native American or Other. OFF. OF THE
DEPUTY CHIEF ADMR FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS:
CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES 3 (Dec. 2005), available at http//nycourts.gov/reports/
AJJISelfRep06.pdf. Significantly, none of the users identified themselves as White. Id.
The income information reported by participants was equally telling: 83% reported house-
hold incomes under $30,000 annually and over 57% reported annual incomes under
$20,000. Id. at 4-5.
5. See SPECIAL REPORT ON FAMILY COURT, supra note 1, at 46; see also, John Sulli-
van, Chief Judge Announces Plan To Streamline Family Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998,
at B7 (noting that in 1997, the average New York Family Court case received "slightly
over four minutes before a judge on the first appearance, and a little more than 11 min-
utes on subsequent appearances") (internal quotations omitted).
6. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 141 (McKinney 2006).
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gants who seek justice there. At worst, it is an institution that by
default obliquely perpetuates bias.7
That the Family Court is ill-equipped to address the needs of
the hundreds of thousands of cases handled therein is not news.8
Exploding caseloads, complex problems, and minimal resources
are just a few of the ingredients that combine to undermine the
Court's ability to fulfill its promise.9 What has been given less
attention until very recently is the extent to which the Family
Court's failures disproportionately impact low-income families of
color.'" Any analysis of the Court's impact or efficacy must con-
7. Most commentators identifying bias in Family Court in New York and throughout
the country focus on the role that courts play in perpetuating practices by child welfare
authorities that have a disparate impact on racial minorities. The child welfare system in
New York City, in which Family Court is a key player, was described by Martin Guggen-
heim in 2000 as "a system that a veritable Martian couldn't help but recognize to be
apartheid." Martin Guggenheim, Symposium, The Rights of Parents With Children in
Foster Care: Removals Arising from Economic Hardship and the Predicative Power of
Race, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 61, 72-73 (2003). Guggenheim went on to predict, quite eerily,
"there will be no change in the complexion of people who come to family court tomorrow or
next year." Id. at 73. Dorothy E. Roberts and Susan L. Brooks focus broadly on how fam-
ily courts throughout the country perpetuate race and class bias in dealing with child
welfare cases and identify "the fundamental problem with family courts is that they treat
family problems according to a family's race and class status." Dorothy E. Roberts &
Susan L. Brooks, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453, 453
(2002). The authors propose, inter alia, reforms of family courts that address institutional
bias. Id. at 456-56.
8. See SPECIAL REPORT ON FAMILY COURT, supra note 1. The full panel report fo-
cuses on child protective matters in New York City but the discussion of Family Court is a
system-wide indictment of the Court. Further, the report cites the nearly unanimous
opinion of judges interviewed in Queens and the Bronx that the system does not work;
those same judges lacked any optimism about changing the system. Id. at 48.
9. See, e.g., Susan R. Larabee, Providing Resources To Family Courts, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
24, 2003 (supporting Chief Judge Kaye's decision to temporarily transfer judges to the
city's family courts to help handle the overwhelming case load, which is exacerbated by
lower salaries for court attorneys, clerks, and court staff, fewer 18b panel attorneys, and
additional requirements that increase the number and complexity of hearings for each
child).
10. Across the country the impact of racial disproportionality in juvenile and family
courts is beginning to spur the interests of researchers and practitioners. See, e.g., Lori
Guevara et al., Gender and Juvenile Justice Decision Making: What Role Does Race Play?
1 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 258 (2006) (analyzing the effects of race and gender on pre-
adjudication detentions and final dispositions in two Midwestern juvenile courts between
1990 and 1994). The issue was examined locally on September 18, 2006 when the New
York State Family Court Judges Association held a conference dedicated to looking at the
issue of disproportionality in Family Court. This historic conference, entitled The Dispro-
portionate Number of Minority Youth in the Family and Criminal Court Systems, was held
at the Judicial Institute in white Plains, New York, and was organized by two prominent
African-American women, Hon. Gayle P. Roberts, President of the N.Y. State Judges As-
sociation and Hon. Cheryl Chambers, Justice of the Criminal Court, Kings County.
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sider the context I have described in my observations of the Court
- the images of black and brown litigants hurrying through
courtrooms where they are often disrespected. These images
raise questions about the role of bias in the Court and the extent
to which the Court's failings disproportionately impact people of
color.
The historic failure to consider the disproportionate impact of
Family Court's ills upon black and brown litigants may have set
the groundwork for practices that unwittingly perpetuate bias.
In the midst of the hurried pace, huge caseloads, and inadequate
resources that define Family Court, a number of quick fixes and
shortcut practices have emerged.1' These practices include offi-
cially sanctioned shortcuts like the ever-expanding use of court
attorney referees to preside over cases, 12 and unofficially sanc-
tioned practices like ex parte communications between certain
judges and some institutional providers. 3
While the failures of Family Court create myriad problems for
parties who seek justice there, I limit my focus here to examining
the officially sanctioned practice of using New York City Admini-
stration for Children's Services (ACS) caseworkers to conduct
court-ordered investigations in private child custody proceed-
ings 4 as one example of how a seemingly innocuous practice
might countenance bias. In many ways, a telling representation
of how the norms of practice in Family Court deviate from ac-
11. The New York City Family court is a unique breeding ground for informal prac-
tices that perpetuate the appearance of impropriety and undermine litigants' faith in the
court. In addition to the frenzied pace and unimaginable caseloads, the casual familiarity
that inevitably develops among institutional players and the legacy of closed proceedings,
have shaped the court into a world unlike any other. See, e.g., SPECIAL REPORT ON FAMILY
COURT, supra note 2; see also Andrew White et al., A matter of Judgment: Deciding the
Future of Family Court in NYC, CHILD WELFARE WATCH (Ctr. for an Urban Future, New
York, N.Y.), Mar. 2006 (special issue highlighting the crisis facing the New York City
Family Court).
12. The use of court-attorney referees to address exploding caseloads is not unique to
the New York City Family Court. In part because of the legislature's failure to authorize
additional judges, family courts throughout the state have relied on these non-judicial
employees. See Merril Sobie, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 121 practice comment (McKinney 2006).
13. While there is no official account of this rule relaxing practice, in over twenty
years of practice I have personally observed ex parte communications between judges and
practitioners on countless occasions and I have engaged in an equal number of discussions
about this practice with frustrated colleagues throughout the city.
14. Custody proceedings between parents are often referred to as "private" custody
proceedings to distinguish them from proceedings where the state is seeking custody of
children from their parents.
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cepted norms of practice and how that deviation is not just toler-
ated, but embraced. The standard explanations advanced to jus-
tify these deviations focus on the nature of the cases and the
enormity of the docket in Family Court - the cases do not lend
themselves to traditional adversarial processing; the dockets are
crushing and these practices are stop gap measures. I posit an
additional explanation: these deviations represent a not-so-subtle
case of the kind of differential treatment that gets institutional-
ized when the consumer is poor and of color, and, as a conse-
quence, disenfranchised.15
Part II focuses on the context, history, and current practice of
using court-ordered investigations to assist decision-making in
private child custody matters. The section begins with back-
ground information on how child custody matters are handled
and decided. I then look more specifically at the evolution of
court-ordered investigations in custody matters, both in terms of
the differing models for investigation and in terms of the common
law procedural due process rights historically accorded parents
subject to investigations. Part III focuses on a New York Trial
Court Rule governing what the rule refers to as "neutral" investi-
gations in Family Court custody matters, and how that rule has
been manipulated in New York City to allow private custody in-
vestigations to be conducted by the local child protective service.
Part III focuses on how bias is manifested through the court or-
dered investigation process specifically and more generally on
how the conditions in Family Court set the stage for biased prac-
tices. I start by examining the troubling bias inherent in investi-
gations done by the local child protective agency, New York City
Administration for Children's Services (ACS), and how ACS's
documented history of disproportionate intervention in African
American and Latino families further undermines the integrity of
those investigations. In conclusion I suggest two alternatives to
the current model that I believe address the concerns about bias
demonstrated not just by ACS, but by the Family Court system.
15. See also Guggenheim, supra note 7, at 73-74 (arguing that low-income, African-
American parents of children in foster care in New York City are considered irrelevant
because they lack political power.).
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II. COURT ORDERED INVESTIGATIONS: CONTEXT, HISTORY,
AND CURRENT PRACTICE
A. CONTEXT: THE CHALLENGE OF DECISION-MAKING IN
PRIVATE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
Private custody cases, in which parents are competing for cus-
tody of their children, represent one of the Family Court's most
challenging proceedings.16 Litigants vying for custody tend to be
particularly acrimonious and often resist negotiated resolutions.17
The steady increase in custody filings in recent years in New
York's family courts'" further intensifies the challenge facing
courts charged with deciding what is best for children using the
best interest of the child test."9 These challenges are compounded
by the fact that judicial decision-making in these cases is viewed
as extremely difficult, because of the indeterminacy of best inter-
est of the child test.2" The test provides judges with nearly un-
bridled discretion to decide custody matters based upon what
they determine is best for the child at the center of the dispute.
On the one hand, the best interest test is recognized as justly fo-
16. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ADVISORY AND RULES COMMITTEE
TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 170 (2006) (noting that
custody and visitation cases are "sensitive, often volatile" and "raise some of the most
difficult issues before the courts").
17. See generally Robert E. Emory, Easing the Pain of Divorce for Children: Chil-
dren's Voices, Causes of Conflict, and Mediation, 10 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 164 (2002) (dis-
cussing difficulties in negotiating with parents seeking custody).
18. Of the twenty-three different case types heard in Family Court, custody proceed-
ings account for 24-25% of the petitions filed each year for the last eight years. Except for
a slight decrease in the number of custody filings in 2003 and 2004, custody filings have
steadily increased since 1997. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., REPORT OF THE
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2005).
19. The best interest of the child test is the long-established standard for determining
custody of children. It is often described as requiring a judge to act as parens patrie or
take over the role of the parent to do what is best for children. See, e.g., Merril Sobie, N.Y.
FAM. CT. PRACTICE § 10:8 (McKinney 2006); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 43 (2006).
20. For a critique of the best interest test, see generally Robert H. Mnookin, Child
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975) (analyzing the challenges of decision-making in child custody
proceedings and critiquing the "best-interest-of-the-child principle") (1975); See also,
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations § 2:02 [hereinafter ALI Principles] ("... the best interests of the child test.
. has long been criticized for its indeterminacy. .
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cused on protecting the rights of vulnerable children who are of-
ten caught between warring parents.21 On the other hand, the
test has long been criticized as an amorphous standard that gives
judges unrestrained discretion to trample upon parents' rights.22
Of particular concern is how broad discretion is exercised in a
manner that permits decision-making based upon value judg-
ments and bias.23  The risk of biased decision-making is exacer-
bated by the challenge of getting complete information during the
fact-finding process because of the adversarial nature of these
proceedings.24
Like many other states, New York's courts and, in one in-
stance, its legislature, have made multiple attempts to rein in the
amorphous best interest test by identifying specific factors courts
must consider when deciding custody matters. 25  The factor
analysis is thought to limit discretion by narrowing the universe
of values judges might consider when deciding best interests.
Another attempt at facilitating decision-making using the best
interest analysis involves providing judges with the power to or-
der an investigation by a disinterested person who can ostensibly
provide the judge with more complete information than might
otherwise be available from the parties.2 6
21. A.L.I. Principles, supra note 20, at § 2:02, Comment b.
22. Id.
23. Id. at § 2.02, Comment c ("To apply the [best interest] test courts must often
choose between specific values and views about child rearing.").
24. See, e.g., MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 77 (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT].
25. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the
ultimate test to be applied in determining custody of children, whether in a de novo dis-
pute or a subsequent request for modification, remains the best interests of the child test.
This test permits courts to examine a number of non-binding factors, including the stabil-
ity of the current custodial arrangement, the child's wishes, the relative fitness of the
parents and the length of time the current arrangement has existed.); Esbach v. Esbach,
56 N.Y.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1982) (reiterating the best interests test outlined in Friederwitzer
and articulating four additional factors courts may consider when determining the child's
best interests: (1) the quality of the environment and the parental guidance the custodial
parent provides; (2) the existence of sibling relationships; (3) the financial ability of the
each parent; and (4) the ability of the parents to provide for the child's emotional and
intellectual development); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 240 (McKinney 2003) (requiring
courts to consider allegations of domestic violence when making child custody decisions).
26. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 213 (2003).
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B. A BRIEF HISTORY: INVESTIGATION BY A DISINTERESTED
PERSON
The court-ordered investigation model predates the creation of
the current Family Court in New York. As early as 1944, courts
in New York endorsed the use of neutral investigators to gather
information from the parties, their children, and collateral
sources through a series of interviews, as a means of providing
the court with comprehensive information.27 An additional impe-
tus for this model was the belief that the investigation would
serve to counter the impulse of parties entangled in the adversar-
ial process to distort and withhold information during a trial in
order to increase their chances of winning.2" Thus, the neutral
investigation model has the potential to supplant the traditional
adversarial model, which provides parties with control over the
evidence the court receives, with a model of evidence presentation
in which the parties potentially lose that control.29 This anti-
adversarial, investigation model of fact finding carries with it the
risk that the right to a full and fair trial might be compromised.
The leading case on the use of investigators in New York, Kes-
seler v. Kesseler, ° addressed the due process questions head on.
Kesseler involved a protracted dispute over the sole child born
during the parties' marriage.3 The parents filed multiple pro-
ceedings and appeals, including the instant appeal to the state's
highest court.32 The intensity of the dispute seemed to frustrate
the lower court and it ultimately ordered an investigation by a
court-employed family counselor, upon the consent of the par-
27. See, e.g., In re Jiranek, 47 N.Y.S.2d 625 (A.D.N.Y. 1944).
28. See, e.g., Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations As Evidence In Divorce Cases, 21
FAM. L.Q. 149, 151-52 (1987) (In a scathing critique of the growing use of court-ordered
investigations in private child custody cases throughout the country, the author argues
that judges rely on these investigations to counter the litigants' "uncontrolled discretion"
to control the information available to judges who must decide what is best for children.).
29. Id.
30. Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 455, 458 (Ct. App. 1962) (holding that Special
Term erred in keeping confidential the reports of a psychiatrist and psychologist and
considering them in awarding custody, because parents had refused to stipulate to their
use rendering them inadmissible hearsay. The court also noted that if the Trial Justice
had ordered psychological or psychiatric inquiries without stipulation, either party could
have called the experts as expert witnesses and the opposite side would have had an op-
portunity to cross-examine.).
31. Id. at 448.
32. Id.
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ties.3 Kesseler set the standard for the use of investigators in
custody matters. Based on the presumption that the investigator
was a neutral information gatherer, the court expressed a prefer-
ence for confidential reports to the court in the effort to protect
the children in the dispute.34 The court also made clear that in
utilizing these reports, courts must protect the parents' funda-
mental right to a fair trial by barring the use of investigation re-
ports by the court absent the consent of the parties. 5
The investigation model continued to develop post-Kesseler,
but at its core was a model of information gathering by a so-called
"neutral" investigator who would prepare a report to be used by
the court to help it reach a decision in the best interests of chil-
dren in custody cases.36 Early decisions also recognized that such
investigations might negatively impact parents' rights, and im-
posed strict requirements upon the investigation process.37
Courts held that while the court could order investigations with-
out parental consent, the use of an investigator's report at trial
required parental consent.38 Investigations were inadmissible
unless made available to counsel in advance of trial,39 one of the
parties called the investigator as a witness, and cross examina-
tion was permitted.4"
Over the past forty years, many investigatory models have
emerged in New York and throughout the country.41 Courts have
used independent mental health professionals including social
workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists, as well as probation
officers, court liaisons, and other investigators.42 Each of these
models posited a disinterested, expert investigator who would
33. Id. at 449.
34. Id. at 458 (finding that where the parties stipulated that the family counselor
could present his report directly to the court determining custody of a child, the court
could consider the report confidential).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 449.
37. See, e.g., Borkowski v. Borkowski, 90 MISC.2D 957 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
38. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445.
39. Id. at 456.
40. Id. at 453.
41. C.T. Drecshsler, Annotation, Consideration Of Investigation By Welfare Agency Or
The Like In Making Or Modifying Award As Between Parents Of Custody Of Children, 35
A.L.R.2d 629 (1954).
42. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445.
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gather facts and be available as a witness to be called by either
party or the Court.
All of these models involved an appointment of a person des-
ignated by the Court to conduct a comprehensive investigation
into the facts and circumstances deemed relevant to deciding best
interests. The common thread in the investigatory models is the
appointment of a neutral fact investigator, who would prepare a
detailed report that would then be submitted as evidence at a
traditional trial in which the common law rules of evidence would
apply.
C. TWENTY FIRST CENTURY COURT-ORDERED INVESTIGATIONS
IN FAMILY COURT: THE NEW YORK CITY MODEL - A
THROWBACK
The law governing the use of neutral investigators in custody
cases in New York has evolved since the Kesseler court issued its
seminal decision." Investigations by mental health professionals,
by far the most common model used in New York, are now more
often referred to as forensic evaluations and there are dozens of
court decisions governing their use." There is also considerable
debate about the extent to which courts should rely upon recom-
mendations proffered by the mental health professionals who
conduct such evaluations in custody proceedings.45 In this Essay
my comments are confined to the practice of ordering investiga-
tions in child custody disputes pursuant to a Family Court rule
43. Westlaw's KeyCite service indicates 150 citing references for the Kesseler.
44. See John A. v. Bridget M., 791 N.Y.S.2d 421(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (reversing a
lower court custody award that was predicated upon the recommendation of an expert
witness who had conducted a forensic evaluation in the case). Compare Rentschler v.
Rentschler, 611 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (reversing a lower court grant of cus-
tody to the mother because of support in the record for the opinion of the court-appointed
psychiatrist that the father should have custody).
45. Not only has there been a flurry of cases on the issue of the use of forensic evalua-
tions in child custody proceedings over the last eight years, but a raging debate has con-
tinued among practitioners in New York led by Timothy Tippins, a frequent contributor to
the New York Law Journal. Tippins has written a series of articles for the journal over
the past three years on the use of forensic evaluations in custody cases. See, e.g., Mark
Fass, Custody Ruling Addresses Reliance On Expert Opinions Judges Enter Debate Over
Determining Children's Best Interest, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 2005, at 1.
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enacted in 1986, Investigation by Disinterested Person; Custody;
Guardianship,46 which provides that,
(a) The probation service or an authorized agency or disin-
terested person is authorized to, and at the request of the
court, shall interview such persons and obtain such data as
will aid the court in:
(1) determining custody in a proceeding under section
467 or 651 of the Family Court Act....
(b) The written report . . .shall be submitted to the court
within 30 days from the date on which it was ordered ....
The broad and ambiguous language here can be read as pro-
viding an end run around many of the due process protections
historically afforded parents subject to court-ordered investiga-
tions.47 The rule is silent regarding the common law requirement
that parents consent to the use of the investigation by the Court.
While the failure to address the parent's due process rights is a
violation in and of itself, the fact that the rule requires submis-
sion of the report to the Court opens the door to further abuse.
The issue of just how the data will be used to "aid" the court is
conspicuously vague.'
More often than not, the practice in the New York City Family
Court is to utilize this section governing investigations by disin-
terested persons to order investigations by city's child protection
agency, the New York City Administration for Children's Services
(ACS).49 Once the investigation is completed, the reports pre-
pared by ACS are delivered to the presiding judge and are made a
part of the court file before a hearing is held on the merits of the
46. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REG., tit. 22, § 205.56(a)(1) (2006).
47. See Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1962); DiStefano v. DiStefano,
51 A.D.2d 885 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Krebs v. Krebs, 443 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981).
48. While the right to consent to an investigation is no longer as absolute as it once
seemed, the right to explain and challenge evidence contained in a report remains in tact.
See, e.g., Sauer v. Sauer, 415 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
49. Commonly referred to as the "COI," these custody investigations are so common
that most courts throughout the city utilize an ACS liaison within the courthouse to ar-
range investigations before the parties leave the courthouse.
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case.5" This practice is problematic on a number of fronts. Pro-
viding the Court with seemingly unchecked power to order inves-
tigations on its own motion, and without parental consent, seri-
ously undermines the established due process rights of parents.51
Beyond the obvious due process problems, ACS, as a child protec-
tive agency, is far from neutral and disinterested. Furthermore,
the practice of ordering investigations by ACS in New York City
is unlikely to provide the Court with the kind of expansive infor-
mation that could help it reach a determination on best interests.
III. A LOOK AT How BIAS INVADES THE FAMILY COURT
A. INVESTIGATIONS BY ACS ARE INHERENTLY BIASED
ACS has a legally mandated, targeted mission that spells out
its very purposeful bias.52 Its overriding mission is the protection
of children from child abuse and ileglect.53 While investigating
families is a routine function of ACS, its investigations focus al-
most exclusively on identifying whether child abuse and/or ne-
50. Documents in the file are available for the presiding judge to review at her whim
each time the case is before her, regardless of whether or not an evidentiary hearing is
held.
51. See Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445; DiStefano, 51 A.D.2d 885. The DiStefano court held
that the trial court erred in keeping confidential the results of an investigation by the
Probation Division of Family Court and the psychiatric evaluations of the parties by the
Family Court Clinic without a stipulation to that effect by the parties. The court remitted
the matter to allow the parties to review the reports, cross-examine those involved in
making them, and present other evidence in contravention thereof. The court distin-
guished between consent for the investigation to be undertaken, and consent to the re-
ports' confidential use. Id. In Krebs, the court held that the husband's consent to the
investigation in connection with a child custody issue could not be construed as consent to
confidential use by trial court of investigative reports. The judge found that the child's
best interests required that the court establish the accuracy of those reports and offer the
parties' an opportunity to explain or rebut material contained therein. The husband was
entitled to review results of investigation, to cross-examine everyone involved in making
the reports, and to present testimony or other evidence in contravention thereof. 443
N.Y.S.2d 530.
52. ACS is the sole public organizational entity responsible for "receiving and investi-
gating... all reports of child abuse or maltreatment made pursuant to [title 6 of article 6
of the New York Social Services Law]." ACS has a duty to "coordinate, provide or arrange
for and monitor the provision of those services necessary to safeguard and ensure the
child's well-being and development and to preserve and stabilize family life wherever
appropriate." N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 423.1(e). I use the term "bias" to refer to the inclina-
tion to seek evidence of abuse or neglect created by ACS's mission.
53. See ACS, Mission and Organization, http://nyc.gov/html/acs/html/about
mission.shtml.
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glect is occurring, identifying children at risk of child abuse or
neglect for the purpose of offering preventive services, and assur-
ing the safety of children who are abused and/or neglected. As
the local child protective agency, ACS also has tremendous power
to intervene in family life where there is reason to believe that
child abuse or neglect is occurring or about to occur.54
By routinely ordering ACS to conduct its investigations in pri-
vate custody matters, the Family Court is undermining one of the
primary purposes of these investigations - curtailing the amor-
phous best interest standard. At first blush, what appears to be a
routine practice, born out of expediency and convenience in an
overburdened Court, is upon closer examination, a not-so-
nuanced expression of a very real value judgment about litigants
who appear in New York City family courts - that they are
likely to neglect or abuse their children or at least need to be
cleared of that suspicion. While the value judgments about liti-
gants often begin with ACS, those judgments are extended in
family courts' sanctioning of ACS decisions. To be sure, this at-
mosphere of suspicion is not lost on Family Court litigants who
understand all too well the power of ACS to disrupt family life.5
Yet ACS's mission is not the only cause for concern when
evaluating the Family Court's practice of routinely seeking inves-
54. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, art. 10 (McKinney 2006). Removal is the most extreme
intervention available to ACS when there is evidence of imminent risk to the health of
safety of the child. Id. §§ 1022, 1024, 1027. Cf Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2004) (limiting the practice of emergency removal without a court order).
55. See, e.g., People United for Children et al. v. The City of New York et al., 214
F.R.D. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). People United for Children involved a non-profit organization
and a group of affiliated African-American parents seeking class certification in a civil
rights action against the City. In describing the class, the plaintiffs identified an atmos-
phere of suspicion that pervades the child welfare system. They alleged that ACS had a
policy of resolving "[any ambiguity regarding the safety of a child . . . in favor of removing
the child from harm's way," and returning children "[o]nly when families demonstrate to
the satisfaction of ACS that their homes are safe and secure." Id. at 255 (quoting plain-
tiffs' Amended Complaint).
Professor Lyn Slater of Fordham University's Graduate School of Social Services and
Violet Rittenhour, parent organizer with the Child Welfare Organizing Project, made
similar comments at the 2006 Conference on the Racial Geography of the Child Welfare
System at Fordham Law School. Slater used the story of one client to illustrate her theory
that a "child welfare mentality" invades neighborhoods plagued by high involvement of
child welfare authorities. Ms. Rittenhour used her personal story of involvement with
ACS to describe the challenges one faces when the task is disproving an assumption that
children are being abused. THE RACIAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM:
COMMUNITY IMPACT AND RESPONSE 7-12, 27-30 (Dorothy Roberts, Leah Hill & Erik Pit-
chal eds., 2006) available at http://law.fordham.edu/documents/int-2RacialGeography.pdf.
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tigations and reports from ACS in private custody matters. ACS
is an agency that has consistently had its own set of struggles in
attempting to fulfill its mandate to protect children. Most re-
cently, the death of four children in a ten week period in early
2006 highlighted the tremendous challenge faced by an agency
with limited resources and Herculean responsibilities.56 I am
more concerned, however, with the agency's struggle with dispro-
portionate placement of African American and Latino children in
the foster care system. A 1998 report on the over-representation
of minority children in New York City's child welfare system re-
vealed the alarming statistics that confirmed what many had
suspected for years - that the child welfare system was far more
likely to intervene in the lives of children of color than their white
counterparts.57 The statistics were overwhelming in the case of
African-American children, who "child welfare authorities were
more than twice as likely to remove from their families as they
were to remove white children, once a report of abuse or neglect
has been confirmed."18  The statistics revealed further that the
population of children in the foster care system in New York City
was overwhelmingly African-American - "about one of every 22
black children [was] in foster care, compared with one in every 59
Latino children - and only one in every 385 white children."59
And African-American children were likely to remain in foster
care longer than their white counterparts - one in four African-
American foster children remains in foster care five years or
more, while only one in ten white children remains in the system
as long.6° More recent statistics demonstrate that overrepresen-
tation of African-American children in the foster care system is
not limited to New York City - it is a nationwide phenomenon.61
When the agency's history of disproportionality is considered,
the use of ACS caseworkers to conduct private custody investiga-
56. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Mike McIntire & Fernanda Santos, Child Welfare Of-
fices That Couldn't Be Fixed Fast Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at B1.
57. Andrew White, John Courtney & Adam Fifield, The Race Factor In Child Welfare,
CHILD WELFARE WATCH (Ctr. for an Urban Future, New York, N.Y.), Jun. 1998, at 1, 4-5.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1.
61. See generally ROBERT B. HILL, CASEY-CSSP ALLIANCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY,
SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ON DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE: AN UPDATE (2006).
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tions becomes all the more suspect, and the possibility of bias all
the more real.
My goal is not to indict ACS and excuse the Family Court.
While the discourse on disproportionality in child welfare has
been mostly confined to examining the practices of child protec-
tive agencies, as the final arbiter of child welfare disputes, Fam-
ily Court should not be let off the hook. In the case of private cus-
tody disputes, given the potential that ACS bias could be im-
ported into the court process via the court-ordered investigation,
it is the Court, not ACS, that must take lead.62
B. SILENCE ISN'T GOLDEN: HOW THE FAMILY COURT
PERPETUATES BIAS
The Family Court's continued use of ACS to conduct court-
ordered investigations undermines the Court's goal of obtaining
complete, unbiased information to facilitate decision-making.
While some might view this practice as yet another attempt to fill
the gap between increasing caseloads and dwindling resources,
the Court's use of ACS investigators likely has a more dubious
purpose. As a group, Family Court judges have an inside view of
the deficiencies at ACS and many have voiced their frustration
with the agency's sometimes inept handling of cases in Family
Court.63 Hence, their reliance on the agency to conduct investiga-
tions is puzzling. If ACS is known throughout the court system
for struggling to handle its primary responsibility in managing
child protective cases, why would judges trust it to gather data in
private custody proceedings? Put another way, why burden an
agency already struggling to meet its mandate? The standard
answer has been that the Court's excessive caseload motivates it
to find shortcuts such as this.
62. A glimmer of hope came with the February 2006 Matrimonial Commission Report
in the form of specific recommendations concerning diversity, including "that the OCA
aggressively pursue a program of training and education regarding diversity issues, and,
that an inter-disciplinary Diversity Task Force be convened to research and make recom-
mendations regarding the development of professional skills, evaluation of existing rules
and regulations to eliminate subtle, inherent biases and to account for the "realities" of
practice in the state's Courts. .. " MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at
xii.
63. See, e.g., SPECIAL REPORT ON FAMILY COURT, supra note 2, at 48.
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While Family Court judges must carry out their responsibili-
ties in extreme conditions,' more troubling motives for this
shortcut exist. A cloud of fear permeates the work of the Family
Court - no judge, lawyer, or case worker wants to be on the front
cover of New York City's dailies, being held responsible for the
abuse or death of a child.6" And yet the fear of public infamy does
not fully explain the Court's decision -to rely on ACS to obtain
comprehensive information in custody cases. If we couple the
image of the courthouse filled with mostly poor, black and brown
litigants with what we know about racial disproportibnality and
ACS, we see another possible explanation: in the minds of some
decision makers, the poor families of color whose lives are im-
pacted by these decisions do not warrant the kind of principled
risk-taking necessary to defeat the officials' fear of bad publicity.
IV. SIMPLE SOLUTIONS: FOLLOW A CONSISTENT MODEL AND
GET BACK To BASICS
Conventional wisdom suggests that the way to solve this di-
lemma is to provide diversity and sensitivity training for judges
and court personnel.66 While I fully endorse calls for such train-
ing, a simpler solution would be to eliminate the ACS investiga-
tion model and ensure that the Court accords all litigants full due
process protection.
The investigation model used in Family Court is in many ways
outdated. There is a lingering idea that the family investigator,
at the behest of a judge, informally gathers information from the
parties and collateral sources. This notion was born in an era in
which caseloads were low and technology was far less advanced
64. Family Court caseloads are growing faster than caseloads of other courts;
caseloads tripled between 1980 and 2000. Somini Sengupta, Brooklyn Journal; In Court,
Families Sit Waiting on the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2000, at 36. The New York City
Family Court caseload was 240,480 cases in 1999, which represented a 40 percent in-
crease in one decade. Eric Lipton, Halls of Justice Going Up All Over; New York City
Nears a Peak In Its Courthouse Building Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at B1. In Fam-
ily Court, the growing docket combined with a 15 percent decrease in the number of 18-B
lawyers available to represent the poor has resulted in repeated adjournments and judges
using their own court officers to search the building for a lawyer who may be available.
Somini Sengupta, Lack of Lawyers Crippling Family Court, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2000, at 35.
65. SPECIAL REPORT ON FAMILY COURT, supra note 2, at 46.
66. See MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 58-59.
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than it is now. One of the first cases in New York to discuss
court-initiated investigations in custody matters was a 1944 case,
In re Jiranek, in which a Referee hearing a custody matter met
informally and separately with the parties and their children, in
an apparent attempt to become intimately familiar with the facts
of the case in a way that is not possible in a typical adversarial
proceeding.6 7 In order to protect the fundamental rights of the
parties, the court obtained each party's consent before using
these informal processes.6" Jiranek evokes the image of a small
town judge who becomes intimately familiar with a family in or-
der to reach a fair decision about what is best for the children
involved in the case.
Fast forward to the Kesseler decision, where due process is
still a paramount concern, but a new model begins to emerge. In
Kesseler, the appellate court found that the lower court's use of
psychiatric and psychological reports obtained during the family
counselor's investigation was a due process violation because the
parties did not consent to the confidential use of those reports.69
The appellate court in effect confirmed that a party in a custody
proceeding is entitled to a full and fair opportunity to be heard, to
call and confront witnesses, and to receive a determination based
upon the entire record before the court. Kesseler also suggests
that the Court can rely on the expertise of mental health profes-
sionals, such as psychologists, social workers, and psychiatrists.7 °
This mental health investigation model has taken off since Kes-
seler and now acts as a significant check on the unbridled discre-
tion of the best interests test.71
67. In re Jiranek, 47 N.Y.S.2d 625 (A.D.N.Y. 1944).
68. In Jiranek, the parties' consent was detailed and specific. They consented to the
Referee meeting with the children informally and outside of the presence of the parties
and their attorneys; they consented to the Referee meeting with the parties separate from
the children and attorneys, and; they consented to the Referee meeting with the attorneys
separate from the parties and children. The appellate court, however, found fault with the
Referee issuing a decision on the ultimate issue of custody based on this informal process
because the parties' consent was made in the context of a visitation proceeding only. Id. at
627.
69. Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962).
70. Id. at 452.
71. The mental health investigation, more commonly known as the forensic evalua-
tion, is not without flaws, however. See, e.g., MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 24, at 47-55.
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The emergence of this model is significant in many respects,
but most particularly because it is the predominant investigatory
model used in custody matters filed in New York State Supreme
Court in connection with matrimonial cases.72 Supreme court is a
higher status court than Family Court, and supreme court liti-
gants tend to be better-off financially and more likely to be repre-
sented by counsel. 73  Even more striking, ACS is almost non-
existent in supreme court. While supreme court judges undoubt-
edly have the power to order ACS investigations in custody mat-
ters where abuse or neglect is suspected, there isn't a supreme
court rule that parallels the Family Court rule governing court-
ordered investigations. 74 Hence, the only comparable process is
the forensic evaluation process. This two-tier system begs the
question, why do we need non-expert investigations in Family
Court?
The idea of a court employee gathering factual information
from parties, their children, and other collateral sources and pro-
viding a report to the court is archaic. The sheer number of cus-
tody cases filed in Family Court 7 makes this practice unworkable
even for a fraction of the cases. Fact gathering investigations
made sense for some cases in a world where caseloads were low,
family mobility was limited, and research in the field of family
dynamics was not as extensive as it is today.
Furthermore, if supreme court looks solely to mental health
experts to help facilitate decision-making in custody matters, why
does Family Court need additional "neutral" investigators? Fam-
ily Court judges can and do appoint forensic evaluators in custody
cases, and their appointment should be enough to address the
investigatory concerns in those truly contested cases that will
require court decision making. This is not an endorsement of the
72. See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.18 (authorizing, inter
alia, the appointment of a psychiatrist, psychologist or social worker or other appropriate
expert to give testimony with respect to custody or visitation filed in supreme court mat-
rimonial actions).
73. There are litigants in supreme court who have limited means and must pursue
their claims without counsel. Their predicament is as dire as those who litigate in Family
Court. See MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 57.
74. In the seventy-page Matrimonial Commission Report, which examines "every
facet of the divorce and custody determination process," there is not a single mention of
neutral investigations except for forensic evaluations conducted by "experts."
MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 46.
75. Annual Report the Chief Judge 1997-2005, supra note 18.
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use of forensic evaluators per se; there is now a fierce and, in my
opinion, healthy debate on the extent to which due process is
compromised by judicial reliance upon the opinions of evaluators
in custody matters.76 What I endorse is a consistent process of
handling private child custody matters across supreme and fam-
ily courts. Without consistency, we are left with a two-tiered sys-
tem in which the cases of moneyed litigants are investigated by
experts while the less well-off black and brown litigants are in-
vestigated by a public agency whose limited objective is to protect
children from abuse. The obvious disparity is self-evident.
Beyond correcting the two-tiered system, courts must recom-
mit to ensuring fundamental fairness. The due process protec-
tions recognized in the early investigation cases - the right to
decline confidential investigations, confront witnesses, and chal-
lenge reports at a full fact-finding proceeding - must not be
compromised. The Family Court rule governing investigations by
disinterested parties is conveniently silent on these issues."
Some might argue that the use of a neutral investigator to
gather information on disputed factual assertions by parties pro-
vides a necessary triage tool in an overwhelmed Court. That the
child custody investigations conducted by ACS help to weed out
the truly contested matters by clarifying disputed facts, i.e.,
where a child resides or attends school, is debatable. While these
facts are more often than not, easily obtainable and can be pre-
sented to the Court at a trial, I am sympathetic to the need to
eliminate those cases where, for example, one party can easily
show that a child attends school regularly in the face of allega-
tions to the contrary. I reject the presumption that ACS is in the
best position to obtain these kinds of objective facts. It appears
that the use of ACS is more a matter of convenience; ACS has an
institutional presence in the Court and that gives Family Court
judges easy access to its personnel. If judges must use ACS to
conduct investigations for the sake of triage and convenience,
they should limit the scope of the investigation to obtaining basic
objective information, like verification of the parents' home ad-
76. See, e.g., MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, note 24, at 51-54.
77. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.56 (authorizing investigation by disin-
terested person who shall report to the court). The parallel rule in supreme court provides
for the appointment of "experts" to conduct investigations and "give testimony." Id. §
202.18.
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dress and size, or clarification of the school that the child attends.
Obviously, investigations would only be necessary where these
facts are in dispute. Interviews with collateral resources should
be kept at a minimum to avoid double and triple hearsay.
Most importantly, investigations by ACS should not be pre-
sumed accurate unless and until there has been an opportunity to
hear from the witness who prepared the report in open court, on
the record, with full opportunity for cross examination. Finally,
courts must make clear that these are not child protective inves-
tigations.7" If, during the course of a proceeding the judge obtains
information that abuse or neglect of a child might be occurring,
she can exercise her power under New York Family Court Act
section 1034 and order a child protective investigation.79 These
basic protections serve at least three functions: they limit the
burden on ACS so that the task of conducting investigations be-
comes more manageable; they reduce the risk of bias by clarifying
that the court-ordered investigation is not a child protective in-
vestigation; and they insure due process by following the tradi-
tional and accepted norms of fundamental fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
We are fortunate to be at a crossroads in opening up the dis-
course on disproportionality in our court system. It has become
impossible to ignore the sea of black and brown faces flowing in
and out of the New York City Family Court. The discussion,
however, must not end with numbers and cries for sensitivity
training. We must expose and address the slights, tolerated
shortcuts, and invisibility that characterize the delivery of justice
to the disenfranchised, and we must correct the imbalance that
exists between the family and supreme courts. The court-ordered
investigation is just one example of how sub-optimal practice can
be institutionalized when the consumer is devalued, not just by
78. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2 (b)(3) (outlining the proce-
dure local child protective agencies must follow when conducting child abuse/
maltreatment investigations following complaints to the State Central Registry for Child
Abuse); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1034. 1(a) (McKinney 2006) (authorizing Family Court
judges to order a child protective investigation).
79. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1034.1(a) (McKinney 2006), but cf. Merril Sobie, N.Y. Fan.
Ct. Act § 121 practice comment (McKinney 2006) (suggesting that the Court must engage
in an analytical process and "conclude" that a child protective investigation is necessary).
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the court system, but by all of society. The good news is that the
fix might be easier than we imagine. Simple, longstanding prin-
ciples of fairness can go a long way. In the end, I am less grandi-
ose, less naive than I was at the outset of my legal career, but I
remain hopeful.

